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Abstract:
Using data from the transparent Indian IPOsetting, the paper examines retail 
investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO 
investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior 
investors’ participation,leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of 
the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand duringthe offer period shows that the 
participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional 
investors. We examine IPO pricing and find thatfavourable demand by retail investors is 
positively associated with a high IPO priceeven after controlling for demand by institutional 
investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail 
investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in 
a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, 
however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their 
participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand. 
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1.Introduction
Despite thevast literature on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), we still know very little about 
investors’ participation and their influence in the setting of IPO prices. While a number of 
important theoretical models, i.e., Rock’s (1986) winners’ curse hypothesis and Benveniste and 
Spindt’s (1989) information extraction hypothesis, crucially rely on the segregation and varied 
participation of informed and uninformed investors, little empirical evidence is available. This is, 
perhaps, due to the opaque nature of the US style bookbuilding mechanism that is widely used 
across many markets. In this paper, we analyse investors’ participation, and in particular, retail 
investors’ participation and their influence on IPO pricing in a setting which is far more 
transparent than thebookbuilding mechanism in the US.  
The Indian IPO market distinguishes itself from others in one important aspect1. Unlike the 
bookbuilding mechanism in US, the IPO mechanism in India is far more transparent. This 
transparency in the mechanism allows investors to observe two important pieces of information 
on a real time basis. First, investors can observe the aggregate demand at different points of the 
offer price range. Second, investors can also observe demand multiples(oversubscription) of 
different investor categories for their respective portion of the offer. Regulation requires Indian 
IPO firms to reserve and allocate a pre-determined quota of shares to three different investor 
categories: qualified institutional investors (QIBs), non-institutional investors (NIIs) and retail 
investors (RIIs)2.
1We discuss the transparency in the IPO mechanism and other institutional features in detail in Section 3. 
2 Qualified institutional investors (QIBs) are large institutional investors registered with SEBI, while non-
institutional investors (NIIs) are large net-worth investors. We discuss the investor categories in detail in Section 3. 
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The transparency in the IPO mechanism, coupled with the fact that different investor categories 
participate for separate quotas of shares may have important implications for investors’ 
participation, IPO pricing and returns. First, information available from the transparent 
mechanism should influence both investors’ participation and the timing of that participation. 
Second, prior research suggests that the nature and timing of investors’ participation influences 
offer prices (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Degeorge et al., 2010). Hence, transparency in the 
mechanismand the nature of investors’ participation that it brings should exert influence on IPO 
pricing. Third, since informed and uninformed investors participate for a different quota of 
shares on offer, uninformed investorsshould be able to avoid the winners’ curse documented in 
prior research (Koh and Walter, 1989; Keloharju, 1993; Amihud et al., 2003).
Using a sample of 306 IPOs issued during the 2001-2010 period,the paper investigates three 
main issues. First, since information on the participation of institutional investors, considered as 
informed, ispublicly available during the offer period, we examine how this information 
influences the participation of retail investors.While prior studies on investors’ participation have 
used the timing (early or late) and the type of bid (market order or price limit bids) to examine 
the informativeness of the bids (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Jenkinson and Jones, 2004), our 
study examines the informativeness of bids by investor type.Second, we examine the influence 
of retail investors’ participation on IPO pricing. We do so after controlling for a number of 
market, offer and firm characteristics, including the participation of institutional investors. While 
Derrien (2005) examines retail investors’ influence in setting IPO prices, the study does not 
control for the participation of institutional investors. Third, since retail investors participate and 
are allocated shares from a separate tranche of shares on offer, we also examine whether this 
setting allows retail investors to earn positive returns after adjusting for allocation.Prior research 
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has examined returns earned by retail investors in a setting where they compete with informed 
institutional investors (Koh and Walter, 1989; Keloharju, 1993; Amihud et al., 2003).   
We report several interesting findings. First, we find that aggregate demand is concentrated at 
either one or two points of the offer price range. Inmost of the IPOs,investor demand is 
exclusively concentrated at the upper bound of the offer price range. In others, it is concentrated 
at the lower bound with very little investor participation in between the two price points. 
Furthermore, we find that a large number of investors, both institutional and retail, submit only 
strike bids which is in contrast to the findings reported in previous research conducted in a less 
transparent setting (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Degeorge et al., 2010; Kandel et al., 1999). 
Second, we provide new insights into the participation of institutional and retail investor in IPOs. 
We find that the transparency in the mechanism induces heavy investors’ participation in the 
later stages of the offer period, which is particularly strong for retail investors. Importantly, we 
find that the early participation of institutional investors significantly influences the extent of 
retail investors’ participation. The participation of institutional investors, on the other hand, 
appears to be influenced by recent market returns, size of the offer and underwriters’ reputation.
Third, analysis of offer prices shows that favourable retail investors’ demand contributes 
significantly to high offer prices.While institutional investors’ demand also influences offer 
prices positively, the economic significance of retail investors’ demand appears to be higher. 
Since recent market return is also positively associated with offer prices, our analysis suggests 
that underwriters exploit market sentiment by setting high IPO prices in the presence of 
favourableuninformed demand and positive general market conditions.
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Finally, we examine the allocation adjusted initial returns for retail investors. We find that even 
in a setting where retail investors do not compete with institutional investors and where 
information on institutional investors’ participation is publicly available, retail investors are no 
more likely to make positive returns. Aggressive bidding by overconfident uninformed investors 
in IPOs with poor institutional demand results in a negatively skewed distribution of allocation 
weighted returns. We, however, find that retail investors can earn significant positive allocation 
adjusted returns by conditioning their subscription in only those IPOs with greater than average 
institutional investors’ demand.   
The paper makes a number of important contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge this is 
the first paper which examines a number of issues in an IPO mechanism which is far more 
transparent than those used in other IPO markets. While some prior studies on Indian IPOs have 
examined the effect of regulatory changes on underpricing (Bubna and Prabhala, 2010) and the 
influence of mandatory IPO grading (Deb and Marisetty, 2010), our paper examines the extent of 
investors’ participation and IPO pricing in significant detail. The paper also highlights key 
implications of a transparent IPO mechanism for investors’ participation and IPO pricing which 
should also be useful to market participants and regulators in less transparent markets.  
Second, our study also enriches the existing evidence on the participation of institutional and 
retail investors. Consistent with prior evidence, we find that institutional investors participate on 
the basis of the information they possess, while retail investors behave as sentiment or noisy 
traders(Aggarwal et al., 2002; Chiang et al., 2010; Degeorge et al., 2010). More tellingly, 
through our analysis of evolution of demand, we provide evidence on the timing of the 
participation of the different investor categories.Further, while prior studies on the timing of 
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investors’ participation have used aggregate investor demand (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; 
Jenkinson and Jones, 2004), we consider the timing of investors’ participation by investor type.  
Third, our paper also adds to the literature that examines the determinants of retail investors’ 
participation in IPOs. We complement Chiang et al. (2010), who show that retail investors are 
influenced by returns on recent IPOs, and provide evidence that information on the participation 
of institutional investors also influences the participation of retail investors.  Finally, our paper 
also extends the findings on returns earned by retail investors in IPO investment (Koh and 
Walter, 1989;Keloharju, 1993; Amihud et al., 2003). Our examination of allocation weighted 
initial returns brings to light the irrational behaviour of retail investors even in a setting where 
information on the participation of informed institutional investors is publicly available. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. 
Section 3 presents some of the key institutional features of the Indian IPO market. Section 4 
develops the hypotheses. Section 5presents the IPO sample and the descriptive statistics. Section 
6 presents the empirical evidence.Section 7 reports concluding remarks. 
2. Related literature 
2.1. Investors participation in IPOs 
There is a significant body of theoretical literature that discusses investors’ participation and 
information production in the context of IPO mechanisms. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), for 
instance, model an optimal IPO mechanism and argue that the pricing and allocation discretion 
afforded by the bookbuilding and two-stage marketing mechanism helps underwriters extract 
valuable information from informed investors. Sherman (2000) models how bookbuilding 
creates regular groups of investors and shows how bookbuilding helps in both lowering average 
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underpricing and providing returns to investors so that they could engage in information 
gathering and reporting. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) and Biais et al., (2002) show that 
Offreà Prix Minimal, a modified auction mechanism used in France, exhibits information-
extraction properties similar to bookbuilding. 
Using proprietary IPO data, Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) 
provide mixed evidence on information production in bookbuilding IPOs. Cornelli and Goldreich 
(2003) find that more informative bids (bids which are submitted early and/or price limit bids) 
not only influence the offer price but also IPO allocations, evidence that is consistent with the 
information revelation theories. Jenkinson and Jones (2004), on the other hand, report that bids 
submitted by investors are not informative for pricing purposes and instead find that the most 
important determinant of IPO allocation is whether the investor is viewed as a long term holder 
of the stock. In a survey of a large number of institutional investors participating in bookbuilding 
IPOs, Jenkinson and Jones (2009) find evidence that is inconsistent with the information 
revelation theory. They find that while only onehalf of the investors actually develops valuation 
models, the rest consider brokering relationships as the most important source for receiving 
favourable IPO allocations.     
In the context of auction IPOs, Kandel et al. (1999) examine demand schedules of Israeli IPOs 
and find highly informative and elastic demand curves. Lin et al. (2007) examine the relative 
ability of institutional investors in Tawainese auction IPOs and find that institutional investors 
are better informed about IPO value and, compared to retail investors, bid higher in IPOs with 
high initial returns. Chiang et al. (2010) also examine Taiwanese IPO auction data and find that a 
higher number of institutional investors or larger institutional bids are positively associated with 
higher initial returns. They argue that while the participation of institutional investors ison the 
  
8
basis of their information about the value of the issue, the participation of retail investors is 
influenced by the returns on recent IPOs, consistent with evidence of return chasing behaviour. 
Degeorge et al. (2010) analyse US auction IPOs and find that issuers and underwriters extract 
useful pricing information from investorbids in setting the offer price. They find elastic demand 
curves for institutional investors, an indication that institutional investors produce and reveal 
information. Further, they report that underwriters exercise significant discretion in pricing by 
setting the offer price below the market clearing price in a large number of IPOs.  
2.2. Pricing of IPOs 
Theories on information revelation and the principal-agent model discuss the setting of IPO offer 
prices by focusing on the role of underwriters. While the information revelation theories focus on 
the role of underwriters in eliciting useful information in setting IPO prices, theories on the 
principal-agent model focus on price setting by highlighting the potential for agency problems 
between the underwriter and the issuing firm. In the context of information revelation theories, 
which assumes that some investors are well informed about the value of the offer, Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989) posit that underwriters price IPOs in order to reward investors who reveal 
valuable information during the offer period. The partial adjustment phenomenon posited by 
Hanley (1993) is also consistent with information revelation theories as price revisions over the 
bookbuilding period and first day initial returns are positively related.   
The principal-agent model which assumes that underwriters are well informed about the value of 
the offer, posits that underwriters face a trade-off in setting offer prices between high IPO prices 
leading to higher commission and high underpricing leading to reduced selling efforts. Baron and 
Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) examine the conflict of interest arising from the 
unobservability of the underwriter’s marketing effort and argue that underwriters exploit their 
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superior knowledge of the market and underprice issues to minimize marketing effortand to 
ingratiate themselves with buy-side clients. Since the burst of the internet bubble, there has been 
a strong interest in principal-agent explanations of IPO pricing with evidence of spinning (Hao, 
2007) and biased IPO allocations (Reuter, 2006; Ritter and Zhang, 2007).
There are several other studies which have also examined IPO pricing. Rock (1986), for instance, 
argues that firms price (underprice) IPOs in order to attract the participation of uninformed 
investors. Loughran and Ritter (2002) present prospect theory in explainingIPO pricing and 
suggest that issuers care less about large underpricing as they not only consider the shares they 
sell, but also those they retain which benefit from high underpricing.Using a large sample of US 
IPOs, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) find that IPOs are highly overpriced compared to 
their industry peers. They also find that the high priced IPOs are positively associated with high 
initial returns but negatively associated with long term risk adjusted returns. Using a sample of 
French IPOs, Derrien (2005) finds that the favourable demand of retail investors has a significant 
positive influence on high IPO prices and that such favourable demand leads to high initial 
returns but poor long term performance. Further, he finds that the favourable demand of retail 
investors is only partially incorporated into IPO offer prices. 
3. Institutional features of Indian IPO market 
3.1. Transparency in IPO selling mechanisms in India 
One of the unique features of the Indian IPO market is the transparency in the offer process. 
Throughout the offer period, information on the participation of various investor categories is 
publicly available on a real time basis on stock exchange websites where the IPO is to be listed. 
The transparency in the mechanism allows investors to observe two important pieces of 
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information. First, investors can observe the cumulative aggregate investors’ demand at different 
price points of the initial price range. Second, investors can also observe the subscription 
(demand multiple) of different investor categories for their respective portions of the offer. This 
information becomes available because investors are required to bid with one of the syndicate 
members who, in turn,initiatesthe order in the electronic book. The electronic book is connected 
to the central bookbuilding software managed by the stock exchange.3 Appendix A shows an 
example of the information displayed during the offer period on the stock exchange website. 
Information on subscription by various investor categories is also widely reported in all major 
print and electronic news media throughout the offer period.
Regulations relating to Indian primary markets have undergone significant changes over the last 
10 years. Prior to the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as the 
regulatory authority in 1992, security issuance in India was governed by the Capital Issues Act, 
1947 and was administered by the office of the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI).  Prior to 1999, 
fixed price was the only mechanism available to IPO issuers. A modified version of the US style 
bookbuilding mechanism was first introduced in 1999 and quickly became the preferred IPO 
mechanism. The bookbuilding mechanism allowed underwriters to exercise discretion in setting 
IPO prices and in allocation of shares in the Qualified Institutional Investor (QIB) category. 
However, in late 2005, in response to some irregularities in the market4, SEBI introduced a 
number of changes in the bookbuilding mechanism. The change in the regulation prohibited 
3 Source: Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) website; www.bseindia.com 
4In 2004 and 2005, irregularities were discovered in theallocation of shares for a number of IPOs including the IPOs 
of Yes Bank, Piramyd Retail and Bombay Rayong Fashion. SEBI unearthed a large scale multiple application case 
in Yes Bank IPO and banned 13 investors from trading in the bank's shares with immediate effect. 
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underwriters from exercising allocation discretion in the QIB category5. Thus, the current Indian 
IPO mechanism, while still referred to as bookbuilding, in practice appears more like a non-
discriminatory or uniform type of auction mechanism, similar to the one used by WR Hambrecht 
in the US.
3.2. Investor categories 
In Indian IPOs, a separate quota of shares is made available for different investor categories. 
Primarily there are three investor categories for whom shares are reserved and then allocated: 
Retail Individual Investors (RIIs), Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs) and Qualified Institutional 
Buyers (QIBs)6. QIBs are generally allocated about 50% of the shares on offer, while about 15% 
and 35% of the shares are allocated to NIIs and RIIs respectively. The current IPO guidelines 
define RIIs as those whose total bidding value does not exceed INR 100,0007. This limit was 
initially set at INR 25,000 in 1995 and has been gradually increased over the years. QIBs are 
large institutional investors such as commercial banks, mutual funds, venture capital funds, and 
insurance companies who are registered with SEBI. Appendix B presents a list of QIBs. All 
other investors whose bidding value exceeds the RIIs’ threshold but are not registered as QIBs 
are considered to be NIIs.   
Investors are allowed to submit orders at prices in increments of 1 INR within the offer price 
range. The regulation requires the offer price range to be within 20% of the floor price. While 
RIIs have the option to submit strike bids (referred to as cut-off bids), both QIBs and NIIs are 
allowed to submit only price limit bids. However, since the original offer price range has 
historically never been revised upwards, submitting a bid at the upper end of the price range is 
5 In addition, issues after November 2005 are also required to allocate 5% of QIB shares to domestic mutual funds. 
6In a number of IPOs, employees are also reserved a certain a portion of the total shares on offer.  
7Equivalent to US$2,500 at the average exchange rate. 
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effectively placing a strike bid. Investors are allowed to revise their bids for both price and 
quantity prior to the end of the offer period. While the offer is generally open for five days, the 
offer period is extended for a further three days when there is a revision in the original price 
range.
While RIIs and NIIs are required to deposit the entire bidding amount at the time of submitting 
the bids, institutional investors are required to deposit only 10% of the bidding amount8. At the 
end of the offer period, the underwriter aggregates the demand and chooses an offer price. All 
orders at or above the offer price are filled on a prorata basis while orders below the offer price 
are left unfilled and refunded. Indian IPO regulations allow the underwriter to re-allocate shares 
from the unsubscribed investor category to oversubscribed categories. Thus, if the RIIs’ portion 
is undersubscribed, the unsubscribed portion is re-allocated to QIBs and NIIs. The allocation of 
IPO shares to different investor groups serves well for the price discovery process. Because 
different investor categories have their own pre-determined quota of shares, informed investors 
can bid on the basis of their own private information without worrying about disruption in the 
price discovery process by less informed investors.  
4. Hypotheses 
4.1. Retail investors’ participation 
A number of theoretical models, including Rock’s (1986) winners’ curse and Benveniste and 
Spindt’s (1989) information acquisition model, assume that some investors are more informed 
than others. The segregation of informed and uninformed investor categories is at the heart of 
their models which have stimulated research that examines whether differences exist in how 
8Retail investors bidding at the cut-off price are required to deposit in the Escrow Account the bid amount based on 
the upper bound of the price range. 
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different investor categories participate in IPOs. The evidence available hitherto strongly 
supports the view that some investors are more informed than others. Prior studies have shown 
that large institutions, a proxy for informed investors, participate highly and hence receive a 
larger percentage of shares in well performing IPOs issued in both bookbuilding and auction 
mechanisms (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Chiang et al., 2010; Degeorge et al., 2010; Hanley and 
Wilhelm, 1995; Koh and Walter, 1989). 
As discussed earlier, the transparency of the IPO mechanism allows investors to observe prior 
demand of IPO shares. Since investors can observe the demand of other investors, it is likely that 
some less informed investors may simply follow those who participated earlier. In fact, prior 
literature has shown evidence of herding by both institutional and retail investors (Lakonishok et 
al., 1992; Shleifer and Summers, 1990). We, therefore, posit the following hypothesis on retail 
investors’ participation in Indian IPOs: 
H1: Uninformed retail investors will submit their bids for shares late in the offer period only 
after observing the demand by early bidders.
4.2. Pricing
The information revelation theories argue that an IPO is priced to reward investors who reveal 
useful information during the IPO process. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) develop an information 
acquisition model where underwriters underprice the offer as a reward to informed investors who 
provide valuable information about the intrinsic value of the firm. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) 
provide empirical evidence of the information acquisition hypothesis and show that investors 
submitting early bids, as well as bids that carry information, are rewarded by underwriters. They 
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further show that price limit bids have a significant influence on the final IPO price determined 
by the underwriters.  
While information revelation theories were developed on the US style bookbuilding mechanism, 
Degeorge et al. (2010) show that information revealed during an auction is equally useful in 
setting IPO prices. They report highly elastic demand curves and find that the demand of 
institutional investors has a significant influence on the offer price. Information available from 
the transparent Indian IPO mechanism allows us to observe informative bids for a large sample 
of IPOs. Hence, weposit the following hypothesis: 
H2: Informative bids (price limit bids) will have a positive and significant influence on the IPO 
offer price. 
Further, Derrien (2005) models the IPO offer price and shows that the final price depends on the 
intrinsic value of the firm as revealed by informed investors and on the sentiment of the noise 
traders (individual investors). Using a sample of French IPOs, in which a fraction of the shares is 
reserved for retail investors, the study shows that favourable sentiments of the retail investorsare 
positively associated with higher offer price. The setting of the Indian IPO market bears a strong 
resemblance to Derrien’s (2005) model as a certain portion of total IPO shares is reserved for 
individual investors. Hence, following Derrien (2005), we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3: The IPO price will be positively related to the demand of uninformed retail investors.     
4.3. Allocation weighted returns for retail investors 
Rock (1986) argues that because of adverse selection, retail investors, on average, are only likely 
to make returns equal to the risk-free rate of return on their IPO investments. This is because 
informed investors participate well only in underpriced IPOs and hence uninformed investors 
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receive a greater proportion of shares in overpriced IPOs. Using data from Singaporean IPOs, 
Koh and Walter (1989) find evidence consistent with Rock’s prediction. They find that, after 
adjusting for allocation, the IPO return is not significantly different from zero. Using data from 
UK IPOs, Levis (1990) finds that the allocation weighted average returns are positive and 
significant. Keloharju (1993) finds that after adjusting for allocation bias, unadjusted average 
returns reduce significantly, evidence consistent with Rock’s (1986) hypothesis. Amihud et al. 
(2003) analyse Israeli IPOs and find that uninformed investors earn negative allocation weighted 
initial returns. They further show that uninformed investors can reduce their loss in IPO 
investment by conditioning their participation on publicly available information.  
Since,in the case of Indian IPOs, a separate quota of shares is reserved for retail investors, they 
do not have to compete directly with informed institutional investors. This eliminates the 
problem of being crowded out by informed investors in good offerings. Further, underwriters for 
Indian IPOs do not have allocation discretion as retail investors receive allocation on a prorata 
basis. Since information concerning the participation of informed institutional investors is 
publicly available at the time of the offer, it is likely that the zero or negative allocation weighted 
initial returns documented in prior studies may not occur in the case of Indian IPOs. Hence, in 
the context of Indian IPOs, we posit the following hypothesis on allocation weighted initial 
returns for retail investors:  
H4: Retail uninformed investors are more likely to earn positive allocation weighted initial 
returns.
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5. Sample data and descriptive statistics 
5.1. Sample data 
Our sample comprises of 306 bookbuilding and auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) and/or the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India over a 10year period from 
January 2001 to December 2010. We exclude large privatization IPOs of utilities and banks as 
they are not representative of average firms. We collect data on firm and IPO characteristics 
from the IPO prospectus. We obtain market data from the BSE/NSE website. We use unadjusted 
prices to calculate initial returns on IPOs and the BSE Sensex index as the market index to 
calculate market adjusted initial returns. Data on IPO demand is obtained from the BSE/NSE and 
some other finance portals including the website of ICICI Bank (one of the leading commercial 
and investment banks in India), Money Control (considered to bethe top finance portal in India9)
and Chittorgarh (considered to be India’s primary IPO investment portal10).
5.2. Descriptive statistics 
5.2.1. IPO sample 
In this section we present descriptive statistics of our sample of IPOs. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics by year. We find that the mean (median) age of the firm at the time of the 
IPOs is about 14.19 (12.21) years. The mean (median) total assets and gross proceeds of the 
overall sample are INR 6,874 (1,945) million and INR 3,535 (1,128) million respectively11. The 
mean (median) leverage (total liabilities/total assets) of the IPO firm is 0.56 (0.60). The mean 
(median) raw first day return (interchangeably used for underpricing) for the period is 22% 
9 www.moneycontrol.com 
10www.chittorgarh.com 
111 US$ is roughly equivalent to INR 45. 
  
17
(13%). This is much higher than those reported by studies using IPO data from the US and other 
developed markets, but is similar to initial returns reported in other emerging markets.  
<<Insert Table 1 here>> 
To account for changes in the market conditions from the time of the offer to the listing date, we 
calculate market adjusted returns12. The mean (median) market adjusted first day return over our 
sample period is 21% (10%) while the one month market adjusted mean (median) initial return is 
18% (8%).  Of particular interest is the number of IPOs with a negative return on the first day of 
trading. More than a third of the total IPOs (111 of 306) have negative returns on the first day of 
trading suggesting that the IPOs are not only overpriced but also that the underwriters’ activity, 
in the after-market to support the prices of the IPOs they manage, is very limited. The overall 
demand for IPOs is captured by the total demand multiple. The mean (median) overall total 
demand multiple is 20.51 (8.08) times which suggests that Indian IPOs are well subscribed.
Following Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) (CG hereafter), we also present the average offer price 
and the quantity adjusted average limit price, both normalized to the offer price range. We find 
that both average offer price and average limit price in our sample is significantly higher than 
those reported by CG. CG report a mean (median) normalized offer price and average limit price 
of 0.51 (0.67) and 0.49 (0.49) respectively. The mean (median) normalized offer price and 
average limit price of our sample are0.80 (1.00) and 0.22 (0.21) respectively. Overall, a larger 
portion of our IPOs are priced at the upper end of the price range and most of the price limit bids 
are received at the lower end of the demand schedule. 
12On average Indian IPOs are listed 21 days from the day the offer is open for bidding.  
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<<Insert Table 2 here>> 
5.2.2. Investors’ aggregate demand 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of aggregate IPO demand. We present aggregate investor 
demand at five different points of the initial offer price range: demand at the lower bound, at the 
mid-point, below the mid-point, above the mid-point and at the upper bound of the original offer 
price range. For demand at below and above the mid-point we aggregate all demand between 
these points.As shown in Panel A of Table 2, on average about 87% of all investors submit a 
strike bid. If we consider investors’ demand for shares at the lower end of the demand curve, the 
total investors’ demand for shares at these two points accounts for about 95% of overall demand. 
Investors’ demand at all other points of the offer price range is almost negligible. Further, the 
demand for shares does not differ significantly by allocation mechanisms. Both bookbuilding 
and auction IPOs exhibit similar participation by investors. Thus, the change in regulation in late 
2005, which prohibited discriminatory allocations to institutional investors, does not appear to 
have made any significant difference tothe way investors participate in IPO offerings. Our results 
are not contrary to those reported by Bubna and Prabhala (2010) who find that underwriters 
exercise significant discretion in allocations13. While the allocation pattern may have been 
different in bookbuilding mechanism, our results suggest that the pattern of investors’ 
participation in bookbuilding does not appear to be different from the pattern seen in auction 
IPOs.
The number of investors who submit a strike bid in our sample of IPOs is similar to the number 
reported by CG for their sample of European IPOs. We investigate this further by examining the 
13It is important to note that Bubna and Prabhala (2010) use a difference-in-difference approach to study the 
implication of a change in allocation rules on underpricing, in which they control for oversubscription, and hence 
their results are not driven by aggregate demand. 
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proportion of IPOs in which investors submit a strike bid. Panel B of Table 2 documents the 
percentage of investors who submit strike bids. As shown in the Table, we find that strike bids 
account for more than 99% of all bids in 111 IPOs (40% of the total sample). Hence, the fraction 
of IPOs that do not have price limit bids in our sample is much higher than the 5% (2 out of 37) 
reported in the CG sample. Further, we find that strike bids account for more than 90% of all 
bids submitted in 201 IPOs (71% of the total sample). Results are similar for bookbuilding and 
auction IPOs. Thus, the overall percentage of price limit bids that we document in our sample is 
not as a result of having a sizeable portion of price limit bids as in CG but rather, it is on account 
of having a few IPOs in which investors bid disproportionately at the lower bound of the demand 
schedule. Further, the low normalized quantity adjusted average limit price of our IPO sample, 
which is only 0.22 compared to 0.49 in CG, also suggests that price limit bids are mostly at the 
lower end of the demand schedule. 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Investor participation  
In this section we analyse the evolution of investors’ demand overtime and examine the 
determinants of investor participation in IPOs. The IPO offer is generally open for subscription 
for five days14. For this part of our analysis we use a smaller dataset of 195 auction IPOs for 
which we have complete data on investors’ demand overtime.   
In panel A of Table 3, we show the subscription pattern of different investor categories overtime.  
We examine demand multiple over the five day auction period. While day 0 refers to the final 
day of bidding period, day 1 refers to the penultimate day of bidding and so forth. Prior research 
14 In case of revision in the offer price range, the offer period is extended for another three days. Very few IPOs have 
revised their price range in our IPO sample.  
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suggests that bids submitted earlier are more informative as these are likely to be submitted by 
informed investors. Results from Panel A indicate that large institutional investors (QIBs) are 
more likely to bid early than both retail (RIIs) and non-institutional investors (NIIs).  We find 
that in 69 of the 195 IPOs, the QIB category is fully subscribed by the end of the third day of 
auction period. The corresponding numbers for NII and RII investors are 59 and 20 respectively. 
In fact, the bulk of retail investors’ participation appears to occur predominantly on the final day 
of the bidding period. The retail portion of the offer is fully subscribed in only 46 of the 195 
IPOs by the end of the penultimate day. Initial analysis of demand over time shows that while 
institutional investors, most likely because of their informational advantage, appear to be less 
interested in the demand of other investors and submit their bids early, the less informed retail 
investors appear to submit their bids only after observing the demand of the more informed 
investors. 
<<Insert Table 3 here>> 
To analyse whether other investors, and in particular retail investors, follow QIBs or have their 
own bidding strategies, we classify IPOs into two categories: thosewith strong and weak 
institutional demand. We consider IPOs in which the QIBs’ portion is fully subscribed by the end 
of the 3rd day (Day 2 in Table 3) as IPOs with strong demand (Rocholl, 2009) and the rest as 
IPOs with weak demand. Accordingly, we have 69 IPOs with strong and 126 with weak 
institutional demand. Results from panel B of Table 3 show that a disproportionately large 
amount of bidding occurs on the final day across all investor categories. Even in IPOs where the 
offer is fully subscribed by the penultimate day, we find heavy participation from all investor 
categories on the final day of the auction period. It appears that for IPOs with strong demand, 
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both NIIs and RIIs essentially follow QIBs. The median strong IPO is subscribed almost five 
times by QIBs by the penultimate day when the median cumulative demand for NIIs and RIIs is 
just 0.68 and 0.52 respectively. However, the final day demand is significantly high, not only for 
NIIs and RIIs but for QIBs as well. This suggests that not only do NIIs and RIIs follow QIBs, but 
some less informed QIBs also appear to follow well informed investors. The finding is consistent 
with Jenkinson and Jones (2009) who report that only one half of institutional investors develop 
their own valuation models while investing in IPOs.
Interestingly, in the case of IPOs with weak institutional demand, we find that NIIs are more 
likely to fully subscribe their portion of the shares prior to both QIBs and RIIs. In these weak 
offerings, NIIs fully subscribe 36 IPOs by the end of the 3rd day (Day 2 in our analysis) when not 
even a single IPO is fully subscribed by QIBs. By the end of the penultimate day of bidding, the 
median demand multiple of NIIs (1.001) is significantly higher than the demand multiples of 
both QIBs (0.64) and RIIs (0.32) with p-values at less than 5% significance level. The difference 
in NIIs’ subscription compared to other investor categories persists even on the final day of 
bidding. RIIs appear to follow QIBs who participate early in strong IPOs.
We undertake a multivariate regression analysis to explain both the early participation of QIBs 
and NIIs and the late surge in the participation of RIIs during the offer period. Our choice of 
independent variables is guided by prior research (Derrien, 2005; Rocholl, 2009) and we include 
a number of control variables including the size of the issue (LnGpcds, log of gross proceeds), 
recent market return (Mkt3Mw), recent market volatility (MktVol), one plus log of age of the firm 
(LnAge) and an industry dummy (HiTech) which takes the value of 1 for IPOs in the hi-tech 
industry (information technology and bio-technology) and zero otherwise. Mkt3Mw is the 
weighted average of the buy-and-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the three months 
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before the IPO date where weights are three for the recent month, two for the next and one for 
the third month before the offering. MktVol is the standard deviation of the index returns one 
month prior to the offer issue date.  
We also include underwriter reputation (LbmRep via a dummy variable as it is likely that more 
reputed underwriters will attract large institutional investors compared to less reputed ones. We 
define reputed underwriters based on the value of IPOs managed by them during the sample 
period15.For explaining RIIs’ participation, we also include early demand of IPO shares by QIB 
(LnDmtlQIB1) investors. We define early demand as the log of one plus the cumulative demand 
multiple at the end of the penultimate day of the offer period. For explaining the early NIIs’ 
demand, we also include the log of one plus the cumulative demand multiple of QIBs at the end 
of the third day (LnDmtlQIB2).The result of the regression analysis is shown in Table 4 where 
the reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All our regressions also control for the 
year fixed effects. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the log of one plus the 
cumulative demand multiple for QIBs (LnDmtlQIB1) and NIIs (LnDmtlNII1) at the end of the 
penultimate day, while the dependent variable in regressions (3)to (5) is the log of one plus the 
final demand multiple for RIIs (LnRII0).
<<Insert Table 4 here>> 
Results from regression (1) suggest that the early participation of QIBs is significantly higher in 
larger IPOs. Further, the early participation of QIBs is also likely to be higher in periods 
following high recent market returns and in IPOs managed by reputed underwriters. Regression 
(2) shows that the early participation of QIBs has a positive and significant influence on the 
15We categorize underwriters as reputed who have managed at least 10,000 million INR during the sample period. 
This results in having 15 reputed and 42 less reputed underwriters. Alternatively, we also look at the top five 
underwriters every year during 2005-2010. Our classification of underwriters qualitatively remains the same.   
  
23
participation of NIIs. The negative coefficient on the underwriter’sreputation variable, along 
with insignificant coefficients on recent market returns, volatility and the size of the offering, 
suggests that NIIs tend to invest in an unpredictable manner and appear to be less well informed.  
Regression (3) examines the determinants of RIIs’ participation for the overall sample16. We find 
that the coefficient on early QIB (LnDmtlQIB1) demand is both positive and significant which is 
consistent with our hypothesis.In fact the early participation of QIBs explains almost one third of 
the variation in RIIs’ participation. Further, when we include the size of the offer, the two 
variables explain almost fifty percent of the variation in RII participation. In regressions (4) and 
(5) we segregate the IPOs into two categories: thosewith strong and weak demand. As discussed 
earlier, we consider IPOs with strong demand as those which are fully subscribed by the QIBs 
two days prior to the close of the offer period. In both regressions (4) and (5) the coefficient on 
early QIB participation remains positive and significant. Thus, the influence of the participation 
of QIBs on RIIs is not only limited to strong IPOs, it is equally influential in the case of weak 
IPOs. Thus our result suggests that RIIs appear to follow informed investors when information 
on the participation of informed investors is available. The coefficient on LnGpcds is negatively 
related to RII participation which is most likely to be a reflection of the size effect as our 
dependent variable, the demand multiple, is likely to be higher for smaller issues than for larger 
issues. Our regression results also show that while recent market returns have a positive 
influence on the participation of retail investors, market volatility has a negative impact on their 
participation. 
16Since RIIs mostly participate on the final day of the bidding period, we use the final day demand as the dependent 
variable. Alternatively, we also use the net demand on the final day as the dependent variable. Our results remain 
qualitatively similar.    
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6.2. The pricing of IPOs 
In this section we analyse the determinants of IPO offer price by conducting a multivariate 
regression analysis with the normalized issue price (NorPrice) (to the price range) as in CG, as 
our dependent variable. Results are shown in Table 5 where the reported t-statistics are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. All our regressions also control for year fixed effects. In regression (1) we 
regress the normalized IPO price on the average limit price (AvLimitPr). Consistent with CG, we 
find that the coefficient on the average limit price is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the limit prices contained in the demand schedule do influence the final offer 
price. However, as discussed earlier, the significant average limit price is due to the high demand 
at the lower bound of the price range in some IPOs. Hence, in regression (2) we re-run the 
analysis with the log of one plus the total demand multiple (LnDmtl). We find that LnDmtl has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the normalized price. In fact, the total demand 
multiple explains more of the variation in the normalized price than the average limit price. In 
regression (3) we include both average limit price and total demand multiple and find that the 
economic significance of total demand multiple is almost three times that of the average limit 
price. Although a large number of IPOs do not have price limit bids, for IPOs in which such bids 
occur,they are highly significant in determining the offer price and hence the finding is 
consistent with hypothesis 2. 
<<Insert Table 5 here>> 
In regression (4) we include the elasticity of demand observed at the average price limit. The 
coefficient on the elasticity of demand is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
higher elasticity is associated with more conservative pricing. Since the elasticity of demand at 
the limit price is mostly concentrated at the lower bound of the demand curve, it is onlynatural 
  
25
that the higher elasticity leads to a relatively lower normalized offer price. In regression (5) we 
include a number of control variables including the demand multiple of the three investor 
categories (QIB, LnDmtlQIB, NII, LnDmtlNII and RII, LnDmtlRII), underwriter reputation 
(LbmRep , log of gross proceeds (LnGpcds , a dummy industry variable (HiTech  that takes 
the value of 1 for hi-tech industries and 0 otherwise, recent market return (Mkt3Mw , recent 
market volatility (MktVol  and a dummy variable for allocation mechanism (Mechanism) which 
takes the value of 1 for bookbuilding IPOs and 0 otherwise.  
As shown in regression (5), the coefficients on both the QIB and RII demand 
multiplesarepositive and highly significant. This suggests that demand from both informed as 
well as uninformed sentiment investors have an influence on IPO prices. More importantly, our 
finding on the influence of RIIs’ demand on offer price is consistent with hypothesis 3 even 
when we control for QIBs’ demand. Moreover, the size of the two coefficients suggests that the 
influence of RII demand is higher in setting high offer prices than the QIB demand. Further, 
recent market returns have a significant and positive influence on the offer price. Hence, 
underwriters appear to exploit market sentiments by setting high IPO offer prices in times of 
favourable demand from uninformed investors and favourable general market conditions.  
Our regression results also appear to suggest that reputed underwriters are more likely to set a 
more conservative price than less reputed ones. The mechanism variable is insignificant, 
suggesting that there is little difference in the way prices are set in the two allocation 
mechanisms. Similarly, coefficientsfor size of the issue, age of the firm and hi-tech IPOs are 
insignificant. In regression (6), we replicate model (5) by leaving out the average limit price and 
elasticity variables to run the regression on the entire sample of 306 IPOs. Overall, our results 
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remain the same although the explanatory power of the model drops as a consequence of leaving 
out these two important variables.
6.3. Allocation weighted initial returns17
Next, we examine the allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors. Since investors in 
each category participate and receive an allocation from their respective quota of shares, it will 
be interesting to observe how retail investors fare after taking into account the overall demand of 
the issue. The unique feature of the Indian IPOs means that while retail investors may receive 
higher allocations in poor IPOs, they will not be crowded out by informed institutional investors 
in a good quality offering18. For this part of our analysis we follow Amihud et al. (2003) and 
assume that retail investors subscribe to a fixed amount in each and every IPO. Since retail 
investors are required to deposit the total amount that they bid for at the time of bidding, their 
funds are tied up on average for about 36 days. On average, IPO firms are listed 21 days after the 
closing of the issue and IPO firms are mandated to refund unsuccessful bidders within 15 days of 
the listing date. For the purpose of calculating the interest expense, we use the State Bank of 
India’s advance rate prevailing for each year in our sample period, which is available from the 
Reserve Bank of India Fact Book. The average interest for 36 days during the period of our study 
is 1.09%. 
<<Insert Table 6 here>> 
17We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting to us that we examine the allocation weighted returns for retail 
investors.  
18Since regulation allows underwriters to re-allocate unsubscribed shares of QIB and NII investor categories to RIIs, 
RII investors may end up receiving higher allocations in offerings which are undersubscribed by other investor 
categories.
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In Table 6 we present the allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns for retail investors 
after the first day (AWMIR1), first week (AWMIR7)and first month (AWMIR30)of listing19. We use 
returns on the BSE Sensex to calculate the market adjusted returns. Results show that while the 
mean allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors is not significantly different from 
zero for the first day and first week returns, it is negative and statistically significant for the first 
month returns. Hence, our results are not consistent with hypothesis 4. Thus, the negative 
allocation weighted returns documented by Amihud et al. (2003) exist, even in a setting where 
retail investors do not have to compete with informed institutional investors. Figure 1 presents 
the histogram of AWMIR30 which shows that distribution of allocation weighted return is 
negatively skewed, confirming higher allocation in IPOs with negative initial returns.  
<<Insert Figure 1 here>>
Figure 2 presents the relationship between first month market adjusted initial returns and 
allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns (AWMIR30). As shown in the figure, most 
observations lie below the 45° line which means that the demand for shares by retail investors is 
much higher than the number of shares which are offered to them. While there are very few 
observations above the 45° line when returns are positive, there are a large number of 
observations below the 45° line when returns are negative. It is perhaps due to the transparency 
in the IPO mechanism, which allows retail investors to observe the participation of informed 
institutional investors, that the allocation weighted returns are closer to zero in most IPOs with 
positive initial returns. More importantly, in IPOs with negative initial returns, the allocation 
19We also calculate allocation weighted returns based on raw initial returns but do not report these as the results are 
similar.  
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weighted returns are extremely negative, suggesting that these are caused by a smaller number of 
overconfident retail investors (Amihud et al., 2003) who participate in such offerings.
<<Insert Figure 2 here>> 
Following Amihud et al. (2003) we also analyse retail investors’ allocation weighted initial 
returns conditional on information that is available to retail investors at the time of bidding. For 
this purpose we estimate a regression model on the AWMIRj with recent market returns 
(Mkt3Mw), market volatility (MktVol), QIB investors’ demand multiple (LnDmtlQIB), gross 
proceeds (LnGpcds) as explanatory variables. We also include a dummy variable to control for 
industry effects (Hi-Tech), a dummy variable to control for the two mechanisms (mechanism)
and dummy variables to control for year fixed effects. Results of the regression analysis are 
presented in Table 7 where in regressions (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variables are the first 
day, first week and first month allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns respectively.      
<<Insert Table 7 here>> 
As shown in Table 7, LnDmtlQIB is positive and statistically significant across all the three 
regressions. Further, while the MktVol is positive and significant for the first day and first week 
returns, it is insignificant for the first month returns. Mkt3Mw, is insignificant in all the three 
regressions. This is because, as shown in Table 4, LnDmtlQIB is highly influenced by Mkt3Mw
and hence some variation in Mkt3Mwis captured by the variation in LnDmtlQIB. Other variables 
do not appear to have any significant impact on the allocation weighted initial returns. Thus, the 
findings show that retail investors can significantly enhance their allocation weighted initial 
returns by subscribing to IPOs with high QIB demand.  
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<<Insert Table 8 here>> 
To further examine the allocation weighted returnsthat retail investors can earn by conditioning 
their subscription on QIB demand we analyse AWMIR by quartile of QIB investors’ demand. 
The analysis presented in Table 8 shows that retail investors can earn positive initial returns by 
only subscribing to those IPOs in which QIB demand is above average. The findings show that 
retail investors can significantly enhance their allocation weighted initial returns by avoiding 
IPOs with very low QIB demand. In fact, the difference in AWMIR30 between IPOs with below 
median and above median QIB demand is 17.64% and the difference is highly significant. Since 
retail investors do not have to compete directly with institutional investors, they can earn returns 
which are significantly higher than zero even when institutional demand is high.    
7. Conclusions 
One of the most controversial features of the bookbuilding mechanism, as it is practised in the 
US and in most other markets, is its complete lack of transparency. In general, the bookbuilding
mechanism is opaque and offers little information on how different investorsparticipate in IPOs 
and how underwriters set the IPO offer price. This lack of transparency has not only hindered our 
understanding of the IPO process, it has also, as critics of bookbuilding argue, encouraged quid 
pro quo relationship between underwriters and institutional investors. The Indian IPO market 
provides us with a unique setting where the bookbuilding is far more transparent and as a 
consequence investors are able to observe the demand of prior investors. The transparency in the 
Indian IPO mechanism enables us to examine the complete demand schedule, demand overtime 
as well as the demand of different investor categories in both auction and a modified version of 
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bookbuilding mechanism. We use the Indian setting to examine investors’ participation, and in 
particular the participation of retail investors, and its impact on IPO pricing.  
Using a sample of 306 IPOs over a 10year period from January 2001 to December 2010, we find 
that the transparency in the IPO mechanism creates demand which is concentrated at either one 
or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of evolution of demand over the offer period 
reveals that while large institutional investors, owing to their superior information, subscribe 
early compared to other investor categories, retail investors appear to follow institutional 
investors.We find that favourable demand by retail investors is one of the most significant 
contributors to high IPO offer prices and our results hold even when we control for the demand 
by informed institutional investors. Finally, our examination of allocation weighted initial returns 
suggests that, on average, retail investors are unlikely to make positive initial returns even in a 
setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, 
can make significant positive initial returns if they limit their participation in only those IPOs 
which attract above average demand from well informed institutional investors.
  
31
Appendix A: Live Bookbuilding on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Website 
This figure shows the information available on the live bookbuilding page on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange website available at www.bseindia.com. The information is also available on the 
National Stock Exchange website site at www.nseindia.com.
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Appendix B: List of Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIB)  
1 Mutual fund, Venture Capital Fund and Foreign Venture Capital Investor
2
Foreign Institutional Investor and Sub-Account (Other Than a Sub-Account which is a Foreign 
Corporate or Foreign Individual), registered with the board 
3 Public Financial Institution as defined in S 4A of the Companies Act,1956 
4 Schedule Commercial Bank 
5 Multilateral and Bilateral Development Financial Institution 
6 State Industrial Development Corporation 
7 Insurance Company registered with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
8 Provident Fund with minimum corpus of two hundred million Indian Rupees 
9 Pension Fund with minimum corpus of two hundred and fifty million Indian Rupees 
10
National Investment Fund set up by resolution F.No. 2/3/2005- DDII dated November, 23, 2005 of 
the Government of India published in the Gazette of India 
11 Insurance funds set up and managed by army, navy or air force of the Union of India. 
This table shows the list of institutions and funds, when registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) are considered to beQualified Institutional Buyers (QIB).  
Source: Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample by Year 
Particulars 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total Median 
Number of IPOs 2 2 3 12 39 56 84 32 19 57 306 
Bookbuilding Issues 2 2 3 12 32 1     52 
Auction Issues     7 55 84 32 19 57 254 
Average Age at IPO 13.55 9.63 11.50 17.76 12.55 13.22 14.31 13.40 14.65 15.94 14.19 12.21 
Average Total Assets (M INR) 625 25,727 19,029 5,079 6,483 5,738 5,998 3,534 13,509 8,508 6,874 1,945 
Average Gross Proceeds (M INR) 479 5,220 3,560 5,441 2,552 2,974 3,311 4,790 5,521 3,366 3,535 1,128 
Leverage 0.41 0.08 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.53 0.59 0.56 0.60 
Raw First Day Returns (IR1) -0.41 -0.04 0.45 0.50 0.35 0.20 0.28 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.13 
Market Adjusted First Day Returns (MIR1) -0.20 -0.08 0.37 0.50 0.32 0.17 0.27 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.10 
Market Adjusted One Month Return (MIR30) -0.10 -0.15 0.30 0.49 0.40 0.23 0.25 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.18 0.08 
Average Total Demand Multiple 1.18 2.53 15.39 28.85 24.20 19.00 30.59 9.31 6.18 15.53 20.51 8.08 
Average QIB Demand Multiple 1.55 2.91 10.14 17.14 23.87 25.69 37.17 11.10 10.10 17.45 23.94 8.08 
Average NII Demand Multiple 1.34 1.97 34.29 60.16 44.97 25.07 41.91 11.91 5.63 35.30 32.93 8.76 
Average RII Demand Multiple 0.66 1.17 9.40 26.02 20.24 8.66 15.05 4.21 2.10 7.94 11.55 4.75 
Average IPO Offer Price (Normalized) 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.90 0.80 0.85 0.70 0.79 0.74 0.80 1.00
Average Limit Price (Normalized) 0.22 0.09 0.53 0.09 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21
IPOs with +ve First Day Return 0 0 3 12 32 31 51 19 11 36 195 
IPOs with -ve First Day Returns 2 2 0 0 7 25 33 13 8 21 111   
This table reports the descriptive statistics of Indian IPO by year. The sample includes IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE from January 2001 to December 2010. 
Age is the difference between a firm’s IPO year and the founding year. Total assets is the total assets of the firm for the quarter prior to the IPO as reported in the 
offer document. Gross proceeds is the gross proceeds of the offer calculated by multiplying the offer price with the number of shares offered. Leverage is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets for the last quarter prior to the IPO. Raw first day return (IR1) is the simple return calculated between IPO offer price and the 
closing price at the end of the first day of trading. Market adjusted first day return (MIR1) is the difference between raw first day return (IR) and the market 
returns over the same period of time. Market return is the simple return calculated between the index value on the offer date and the date of listing. We use the 
BSE Sensex as our measure of the market return. Market adjusted one month return is the difference between the simple one month IPO return and the market 
return over the same period of time. Total demand multiple is the ratio of the investors’ demand for shares (at and above the offer price) and the total number of 
shares offered. QIB demand multiple is the ratio of the Qualified Institutional Buyers’ (QIBs) demand for shares (at and above the offer price) and the total 
number of shares offered to the QIB category. NII demand multiple is the ratio of the Non-Institutional Investors’ (NIIs) demand for shares (at and above the 
offer price) and the total number of shares offered to the NII category. RII demand multiple is the ratio of the Retail Individual Investors’ (RIIs) demand for 
shares (at and above the offer price) and the total number of shares offered to the RII category.  IPO offer price(normalized) is the normalized issue offer price by 
the initial price range. Limit price(normalized) is the quantity weighted average of all limit prices normalized by the initial offer price range. (1 US$ 
approximately equal to INR 45). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Aggregate Demand Schedule 
Panel A: Investor’s demand at different points of the offer price range-by IPO
Panel B: Proportion of strike bids submitted by investors
% Strike Bids by Investors Bookbuilding Auction Total  
Less than 30% 5 14 19  
30-60% 0 14 14  
60-70% 2 5 7  
70-80% 0 13 13  
80-90% 4 23 27  
90-95% 5 23 28  
95-99% 9 53 62  
More than 99% 16 95 111  
Total 41 240 281  
Panel A shows investors’ demand at different points of the price range for the overall sample and separately for bookbuilding and auction IPOs. For demand at below and 
above the mid-point we aggregate all demand between those points. We use the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference in medians between IPO allocation mechanisms. 
Panel B shows the number of IPOs that receive certain proportion of total bids as strike bids by allocation mechanism. The Less than 30% categoryshows the number of 
IPOs in which strike bids accountfor less than 30% of the total bids. The 30-60% categoryshows the number of IPOs in which strike bids account more than 30% but less 
than 60% of the total bids and so forth. The More than 99% category shows the number of IPOs in which more than 99% of the total bidswas in the form of strike bids. 
Strike bids are the sum of all the price cut-off bids submitted by retail individual investors (RIIs) and the bids submitted at the upper bound by all investor categories. Since 
the Indian IPO price range has never been revised upward, submitting a bid at the upper bound of the price range is effectively submitting a strike bid. 

Lower Bound Below Mid-Point Mid-Point Above Mid-Point Upper Bound No of Obs. 
Overall Sample 7.24 2.50 1.97 1.17 86.97 281  
Bookbuilding 16.16 5.59 2.10 3.06 73.01 240  
Auction 5.71 1.97 1.95 0.84 89.35 41  
        
Wilcoxon Z statistics        
Bookbuilding -Auction (z) 0.341 1.456 1.541 1.575 -0.432   
Prob > |z| (0.7330) (0.1453) (0.1232) (0.1153) (0.6661)   
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Table 3: Demand Over-time
Panel A: Number of fully subscribed IPOs by the end of each bidding day 
Cumulative Demand Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 
Institutional Investors (QIBs) 156 109 69 35 7 
Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs) 171 95 59 22 7 
Retail Investors (RIIs) 153 46 20 6 2 
Total 193 89 56 21 5 
Panel B : Cumulative demand over the bidding period by strength of QIBs demand
Cumulative Demand Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 
Strong Demand (N=69)      
Institutional Investors (QIBs)     
Mean 48.2549 9.4530 3.5355 1.7468 0.3614 
Median 33.8607 4.9975 2.3056 0.9531 0.0000 
SD 50.1222 11.5572 3.6303 2.7849 1.0994 
Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs)     
Mean  57.7188 2.5369 1.3359 0.6297 0.1193 
Median 31.4805 0.6882 0.1811 0.0058 0.0000 
SD 68.9360 4.7335 2.3090 1.6242 0.8328 
Retail Investors (RIIs)     
Mean 16.9954 1.8301 0.7070 0.1482 0.0145 
Median 9.4057 0.5250 0.1952 0.0300 0.0000 
SD 22.7582 3.1549 1.3242 0.2999 0.0539 
Weak Demand (N=126)     
Institutional Investors (QIBs)     
Mean 10.7327 1.6490 0.2707 0.0962 0.0279 
Median 1.9787 0.6394 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000 
SD 21.9296 3.6925 0.2903 0.2149 0.1141 
Non-Institutional Investors (NIIs)     
Mean  18.1568 1.5494 0.9973 0.2999 0.1066 
Median 4.5951 1.0019 0.3978 0.0000 0.0000 
SD 35.5539 1.9305 1.5817 0.6448 0.3947 
Retail Investors (RIIs)     
Mean 5.7419 0.5062 0.2607 0.1123 0.0433 
Median 2.8865 0.3241 0.1084 0.0062 0.0000 
SD 7.8337 0.5435 0.3949 0.2612 0.1838 
Wilcoxon z-statistics     
QIBs = Weak - Strong -6.687*** -9.159*** -11.635*** -7.251*** -3.076*** 
NIIs= Weak - Strong -3.603*** -0.294 -0.682 -1.246 0.024 
RIIs= Weak - Strong -3.845*** -3.088*** -2.809*** -2.607*** -0.568 
Panel A shows the number of IPOs in which the shares reserved for various investor categories are fully subscribed over 
the offer period. Day 0 is the final bidding day of the offer period while Day 4 is thefirst day of offer for most of the 
sample IPOs. The sample consists of 195 auction IPOs for which we have data on investors’ participation over time. 
There are two IPOs in which the total demand multiple is just below 1. Panel B shows the number of IPOs in which the 
shares reserved for various investor categories are fully subscribed over the offer period by IPOs with strong and weak 
QIBs (institutional investors) demand. IPOs are considered to be strong if QIBs fully subscribe to their portion of the offer 
by the end of the third day of bidding period (Day 2 in this table). We use the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the difference in 
median in investor participation between the two IPO categories. *** denote the difference is significant at less than 1% 
level. 
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Table 4: Determinants of investors’ participation overtime: OLS regression 
QIB1
(1) 
NII1
(2) 
RII0
(3) 
RII0 (Strong=1) 
(4) 
RII0 (Strong=0) 
(5) 
LnDmtlQIB2  0.303***    
  (3.18)    
      
LnDmtlQIB1   0.807*** 0.9268*** 0.5887*** 
   (10.71) (6.60) (5.44) 
      
LnGpcds 0.234*** 0.0386 -0.431*** -0.4680*** -0.3585*** 
 (3.63) (0.61) (-6.97) (-6.46) (-3.23) 
      
LbmRep 0.387*** -0.415*** -0.106 -0.1234 -0.1541 
 (2.82) (-3.71) (-0.66) (-0.47) (-0.68) 
      
Mkt3Mw 2.186** 1.001 3.859*** 3.1167** 4.0613*** 
 (2.01) (1.17) (5.53) (2.59) (4.67) 
      
MktVol 6.867 -2.013 -20.69*** -16.95 -23.47** 
 (0.53) (-0.24) (-2.99) (-1.47) (-2.49) 
      
HiTech 0.245 -0.277** -0.058 -0.1203 -0.1511 
 (1.36) (-2.08) (-0.39) (-0.49) (-0.07) 
      
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant -1.136** 0.439 4.167*** 4.2631*** 3.8106*** 
 (-2.57) (1.17) (9.60) (6.84) (5.01) 
Observations 195 195 195 69 126 
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.133 0.535 0.688 0.318 
This table reports the OLS regression on the participation of different investor categories overtime on a sample of 195 
auction IPOs. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the logarithm of one plus demand multiple at the end of 
the penultimate day of the offer period for Qualified Institutional Buyers (LnDmtlQIB1) and Non-Institutional Investors 
(LnDmtlNII1) respectively. The dependent variable in regressions (3) to (5) is the demand multiple at the end of the 
bidding period for Retail Individual Investors (RII0). LnDmtlQIB2 is the logarithm of one plus the demand multiple of 
QIBs two days prior to the end of the bidding period. LbmRep is a binary variable which equals 1 for reputed 
underwriters and 0 otherwise. LnGpcds is the logarithm of gross proceeds. Mkt3Mw is the weighted average of the buy-
and-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the three months before the IPO date where weights are 3 for the recent 
month, 2 for the next and 1 for the third month before the offering. MktVol is standard deviation of the index returns one 
month prior to the offer issue date. HiTech is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs in the information technology 
and biotechnology industries and 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-consistent t- statistics are in parentheses. ***and 
** indicate statistical significance at less than 1% and 5% levels. 
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Table 5: Determinants of the offer price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AvLimitPr 5.825***  3.104*** 1.476* 1.109*  
 (4.56)  (3.31) (1.93) (1.86)  
       
LnDmtl  1.102*** 1.012*** 0.790***   
  (5.62) (5.24) (4.91)   
       
LnDmtlQIB     0.319** 0.357** 
     (2.31) (2.46) 
       
LnDmtlNII     -0.00340 -0.0140 
     (-0.03) (-0.10) 
       
LnDmtlRII     0.918*** 1.157*** 
     (4.02) (4.70) 
       
Elasticity     -0.0582*** -0.0247***  
    (-4.53) (-2.74)  
       
LbmRep     -1.583*** -1.660*** 
     (-4.67) (-4.77) 
       
LnGpcds     0.00269 -0.104 
     (0.03) (-1.02) 
       
Hi-Tech     0.164 0.225 
     (0.47) (0.67) 
       
Mkt3Mw     2.995* 2.957* 
     (1.77) (1.72) 
       
MktVol     10.44 1.968 
     (0.62) (0.11) 
       
Mechanism     -0.0145 -0.300 
     (-0.05) (-1.00) 
       
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 1.859*** 1.631*** 1.495*** 1.284*** 0.915*** 1.026*** 
 (6.62) (6.96) (6.74) (6.80) (7.01) (7.22) 
Observations 281 306 281 281 281 306 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.172 0.229 0.310 0.476 0.414 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the Tobit regression model examining the determinants of offer price. The 
dependent variable is the offer price normalized by the initial offer price range. Average Limit Price (AvLimitPr) is the 
quantity-weighted average of all limit prices and is normalized by the initial offer price range. LnDmtl, LnDmtlQIB, 
LnDmtlNII and LnDmtlRII are the logarithms of one plus demand multiple (total share bid at or above the offer price divided 
by the total shares offered) of total offer, qualified institutional buyers (QIB), non-institutional investors (NII) and retail
individual investors (RII) respectively. Elasticity is the elasticity of demand computed from the lower bound of the demand 
schedule to the average quantity adjusted limit price. LbmRep is a binary variable which equals 1 for reputed underwriters 
and 0 otherwise for regressions. LnGpcds is the logarithm of gross proceeds. Mkt3Mw is the weighted average of the buy-
and-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the three months before the IPO date where weights are 3 for the recent month, 
2 for the next and 1 for the third month before the offering. MktVol is standard deviation of the index returns one month prior 
to the offer issue date. HiTech is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for IPOs in the information technology and 
biotechnology industries and 0 otherwise. Mechanism is a dummyvariable which takes the value of 1 for bookbuilding IPOs 
and 0 for auction IPOs. Robust t- statistics are in parentheses.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at less than 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 6: Allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors 
Sum Mean Median Skewness Minimum Maximum 
AWIR1 (%) 0.2469 0.3200 2.0469 -274.96 290.01 
 (0.1144) (1.1310)   
AWIR7 (%) -1.5983 0.4700 2.9301 -224.22 432.42 
 (-0.6328) (0.2310)   
AWIR30 (%) -6.5682 -0.1300 -0.5586 -262.85 299.76 
 (-2.4952) (-2.0690)   
This table reports the allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns (MIR) for retail investors (RIIs).AWMIR1, AWMIR7and 
AWMIR30are the first day, first week and first month allocation weighted initial returns. Allocation weighted initial return is calculated
as initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses. We use the State Bank of India’s (SBI) advance interest
rates for calculating interest expense. The t and z statistics test that the mean and median are different from zero. 
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Figure 1: Allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors 
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Allocation weighted initial returns
This figure shows the distribution of the first month allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns for retail investors. Allocation 
weighted initial return is calculated as initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses. We use the State Bank 
of India’s (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense. 
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Figure 2: Initial returns and allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors 
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Initial returns
This figure presents the scatter plot for first day market adjusted initial returns and the allocation weighted market adjusted initial 
returns for retail investors. Allocation weighted initial return is calculated as initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the 
interest expenses. We use the State Bank of India’s (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense.  
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Table 7: Conditional allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors 
 AWIR1
(1) 
AWIR7
(2) 
AWIR30
(3) 
Mkt3Mw 0.3563 0.2005 -0.3449 
 (0.71) (0.44) (-0.67) 
    
MktVol 19.252*** 21.032*** 78.66 
 (3.06) (2.70) (1.54) 
    
LnDmtlQIB 0.0491*** 0.0622*** 0.0870*** 
 (2.77) (3.22) (4.76) 
    
LnGpcds -0.0305* -0.0233 -0.0342 
 (-1.69) (-0.94) (-1.64) 
    
Hi-Tech 0.0226 0.1671 0.0867 
 (0.28) (1.34) (1.53) 
    
Mechanism 0.0064 0.0186 -0.0005 
 (0.14) (0.32) (-0.01) 
    
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -0.1820 -0.3550 -0.1088 
 (-0.90) (-1.29) (-0.42) 
Observations 306 306 306 
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.099 0.051 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the OLS regression model which examines conditional allocation weighted initial 
returns for retail investors. The dependent variable in regressions (1), (2) and (3) is allocation weighted first day, first week and first 
month market adjusted initial returns respectively. We calculate allocation weighted market adjusted initial return by dividing market 
adjusted initial returns by RII demand multiple and subtracting it from interest expenses.Mkt3Mw is the weighted average of the buy-
and-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the three months before the IPO date where weights are 3 for the recent month, 2 for the 
next and 1 for the third month before the offering. MktVol is standard deviation of the index returns one month prior to the offer issue 
date. LnDmtlQIB,is the logarithm of 1 plus demand multiple (total share bid at or above the offer price divided by the total shares 
offered) of qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). LnGpcds is the logarithm of gross proceeds. HiTech is a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 for IPOs in the information technology and biotechnology industries and 0 otherwise. Mechanism is a dummyvariable which takes 
the value of 1 for bookbuilding IPOs and 0 for auction IPOs. Robust  t- statistics are in parentheses. *** and * indicatestatistical 
significance at less than 1% and 10% levels. 
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Table 8: Allocation weighted initial returns for retail investors by QIB’s demand for shares 

            Quartile of QIB Investors’ Demand 
 1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High) 
Diff  
(Above 2- Below 2) 
Mean AWMIR1 (%) -7.939 -0.05 4.531 2.322 7.4216 
 (-1.0733) (-0.0156) (1.9056) (4.6196) (2.2815) 
     
Mean AWMIR7 (%) -12.576 -4.531 6.1377 2.1525 12.6985 
 (-1.4536) (-1.0865) (1.6667) (3.6551) (3.5825) 
     
Mean AWMIR30 (%) -22.5667 -6.578 4.0174 2.113 17.6378 
 (-2.9141) (-1.0067) (2.2528) (2.6925) (4.1623) 
In this table we report the allocation weighted market adjusted initial returns for retail investors according to the 
quartile of QIB investors’ demand. AWMIR1, AWMIR7, & AWMIR30are the allocation weighted market adjusted first 
day, first week and first month initial returns. Market adjusted initial returns are raw initial returns adjusted by return 
on the BSE Sensex over the same period of time. Allocation weighted market adjusted initial return is calculated as 
market adjusted initial returns divided by RII demand multiple less the interest expenses.  We use the State Bank of 
India’s (SBI) advance interest rates for calculating interest expense. Figures in parenthesis show t-statistics which 
examine whether the mean is different from zero.Diff is the difference in AWMIR between IPOs with above and 
below median QIB investors’ demand. 
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Highlights
 We examine IPOs in a setting which is far more transparent than other markets. 
 Transparency in IPO mechanism leads to concentrated demand.  
 Demand of retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price.  
 We find that retail investors exhibit overconfidence in IPO investments. 
 Retail investors can do well by following institutional investors. 
